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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE APPLICATION OF ANTI-
TRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS*
By MAXwELL KEITHt
An analysis of the case of Radovich v. National Football League,' hold-
ing that professional football is within the scope of the antitrust laws, will
be attempted herein by first discussing the circumstances which led up to
the Radovich decision, then considering the effect of the Radovich case,
and then by considering the developments which the decision has induced.
The Situation Before the Radovich Decision
The federal antitrust laws2 regulate the nation's business economy.
These laws are our basic economic constitution. They decree that competi-
tion, not combination, is the law of the land.' They prevent the economic
oppression of the individual and give him protection against destructive
practices engaged in by those who wield existing power in the industry.4
They form the framework of our distributive economic system and guar-
antee, as far as federal power extends, every person the opportunity to
engage in business and obtain his competitive worth.5 Included in their
* The H AsTINs LAw JouRrAL has undertaken to provide for a discussion of the decision
in Radovich v. National Football League. In 9 HEAsT Gs LJ. 18 (1957), Mr. John O'Dea, an
attorney for the National Football League, contributed an article entitled "Professional Sports
and the Antitrust Laws." Mr. Keith, one of the attorneys who represented the plaintiff, con-
tributes this article.
t B.A., 1949, Stanford University; J.D., 1950, University of Chicago Law School. Member
of the California Bar.
1352 U.S. 445 (1957).
2 The basic antitrust statute is popularly known as the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1957). Section 1 provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal: ....
Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
a Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941).
4 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553-55 (1944) ; United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 "The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated." Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948). See Anderson v. Ship-
owners' Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926). See also cases cited note 4 supra.
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aims are the prevention of trusts6 and the evils felt to occur when monopoly
conditions occur in an industry. Organized professional sport leagues oper-
ate akin to a "trust" in form. A professional sporting league is a closely
knit combination of firms or corporations formed by an agreement which
regulates the activities of the individual members and delegates authority
to a commissioner or president. The organization of all owners in an indus-
try allows the displacement of the free competitive market. The evils of the
"trust" organization were attacked in the debates preceding the enactment
of the Sherman Antitrust Bill in 1890.7
The sport leagues control a significant part of our national income.'
They directly affect the young athlete. In this sphere they have undertaken
to assume responsibilities over one of the most important aspects of Ameri-
can life, the final development of physical abilities and nationwide identi-
fication with such abilities. The athletic world promises to many a young
man a rainbow of wealth, status and acclaim. The professional sporting
trusts are the end of the rainbow. Yet until recently these professional
sporting trusts were virtually above the law. They could operate free of
the federal antitrust laws, and this meant that they could operate over and
above the American economic constitution, and be outside the rules of busi-
ness conduct which assured fair play and equal opportunity. And since they
were interstate in nature and operation this meant that they were in essence
another "sovereign state," uncontrolled and unregulated by any single state.
Since these leagues have been interstate monopolies in their respective
fields of baseball, football, hockey and basketball9 this meant that their
edicts and declarations were virtually "law." These "laws" were incapable
6 Senator Sherman, in his discussion of his bill, referred to the trust as follows: "But
associated enterprise and capital are not satisfied with partnerships and corporations competing
with each other, and have invented a new form of combination commonly called trusts, that
seeks to avoid competition by combining the controlling corporations, partnerships, and indi-
viduals engaged in the same business, and placing the power and property of the combination
under the government of a few individuals, and often under the control of a single man called
a trustee, a chairman, or a president." 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890). It is noted that Senator
Sherman specifically condemned the ability of the trust to command the price of labor without
fear of strikes. Ibid.
720 and 21 CONG. 1rc. passim (1889) and (1890), Debates on Senate Bills No. 3445 and
No. 1.
8 As of 1950 the personal consumption expenditure of the public for professional baseball,
football, hockey and basketball was approximately $140,000,000. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1952).
9 The organization and framework of organized baseball as of 1953 is discussed in full in
Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YAtz
L.J. 576 (1953). The structure of organized baseball, the National Football League [hereinafter
N.F.L.1, the National Hockey League [hereinafter N.H.L.], and the National Basketball Asso-
ciation [hereinafter N.B.A.] are set forth in the Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee
on the Study of Organized Professional Team Sports of the House Committee oj the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 Hearings].
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10
of attack as federal questions, and beyond the authority of the federal
government.
The Federal Baseball Case
This enormous power was brought about by the case of Federal Base-
ball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.10
In this case, the plaintiff, a member of a putative third baseball league,
had charged that organized baseball had intended to control the baseball
industry, ruin the new league, and drive him out of business. The jury
awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount of $80,000.00. But the appel-
late court" held that baseball was not under the antitrust laws because not
engaged in interstate trade and commerce. The Supreme Court, per Justice
Holmes, affirmed, saying: "The business is giving exhibitions of baseball,
which are purely state affairs."
It must be pointed out that Justice Holmes was rendering a decision at
a time when the commerce clause of the Constitution had less vitality than
that which subsequent economic conditions produced. In 1895 the Supreme
Court had held that manufacturing, agriculture, mining and production in
any form within a state were outside federal jurisdiction. 2 The impact
of this decision had not been fully dissipated by 1922, although it had
been substantially cut down.' As the federal government began to adopt
extensive regulations as to nationwide industrial conditions, the commerce
clause of the Constitution became the legal battleground. By 1942 the
power of the Congress under the commerce clause was extensive.' 4 The
antitrust laws, by the extension of the commerce clause, were applicable
to all industries doing business in, or substantially affecting, interstate
trade and commerce.' 5
What, then, of the Federal Baseball case? In 1949 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Gardella v. Chandler," held that although Federal
Baseball was not an "impotent zombie," it did not prevent a baseball player
from seeking damages under the antitrust laws as a result of a boycott
imposed upon him for playing in the Mexican League upon his request to
play baseball in the United States. Judge Frank condemned the "reserve
10 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
11269 Fed. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
12 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
Is United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See discussion in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-34 (1948).
14 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), following United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
15 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
16 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
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clause" system of baseball, and held it was opposed to the public policy of
the United States. Judge Frank stated:
For the "reserve clause", as has been observed, results in something resem-
bling peonage of the baseball player. By accepting the "reserve clause"-
and all players in organized baseball must "accept" it-a player binds him-
self not to sign a contract with, or play for, any club other than the club
which originally employs him or its assignee.
Judge Hand would not commit himself on the legality of the "reserve
clause" structure, but ruled that a restraint which prevented a player from
practicing his calling was an actionable restraint of trade. Judge Chase did
not believe that the antitrust laws applied to baseball at all. It appeared as
if the courts would not grant organized professional sports an exemption
from the application of the antitrust laws where there was a showing of
injury to players whose livelihood and pursuit of happiness in the sports
world were subject to group boycott.'8
Congressional Study
After the Gardella decision baseball settled the case without resort to
the Supreme Court. Bills were then introduced in the House and Senate
which would have granted the "organized professional sports enterprises"
exemption from the antitrust laws.'9 These bills contemplated that such
sports enterprises be completely exempt from the antitrust laws. On July
30, 1951, the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee
of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, conducted a study of organized
baseball. Its report was issued on May 27, 1952. It concluded that baseball
was engaged in interstate commerce, and recommended that no such sweep-
ing legislative action should be undertaken until the status of Federal
Baseball was clarified in the courts. 9
Then came Toolson v. New York Yankees." Toolson was a demoted
player in the New York Yankees farm system who complained of the re-
17 Id. at 409-10.
18 The individual injured by a violation of the antitrust laws has a direct right to sue the
violators under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952):
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
19 H.R. REP. No. 4229, 4230, 4231 and S. REP. No. 1526, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
2 0 H.R. REP. No. 2002, 7, 230-32 (1952).
21346 U.S. 356 (1953). A writ of certiorari was taken from 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952).
The cases of Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953) and Kowalski v. Chandler,
202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953) were also included in the hearing. The Kowalski case involved
the denial of advancement opportunities, and the Corbett case involved the recognition by
baseball of a contract in the Mexican League.
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serve clause agreement and its enforcement. Here the Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether or not it should overrule Federal Baseball
in view of the recent congressional study of organized baseball. The Su-
preme Court held, in a per curiam decision, that it was for Congress, not
the Court, to overrule Federal Baseball as to the "business of baseball"
which had been specifically investigated by Congress and which had been
the subject of specific prior Supreme Court ruling.
The International Boxing Club Decision
The next decision to touch the professional sport world under the anti-
trust laws was United States v. International Boxing Club.2 Here the
United States alleged that the defendants had conspired to monopolize the
promotion, exhibition and sale of radio, television and motion picture rights
of professional championship boxing contests in the United States. It was
alleged that the defendants conspired to purchase promotional control of
certain championships; acquired the assets of competitors; and acquired
the exclusive use of principal stadia and arenas. It was charged that as a
condition of being afforded an opportunity to engage in a championship
contest contenders were required to enter into a contract. Pursuant to this
contract the contender, if he won the contest and thereby became a cham-
pion, would engage in title bouts only under the promotion of the defend-
ants for a period of from three to five years. The complaint alleged that
over twenty-five per cent of the defendants' income was attributed to tele-
vision, motion picture, and radio revenues.
The issue confronting the Supreme Court was whether or not antitrust
immunity of professional sports would be extended beyond the business
of baseball. The Court refused to make this extension. It said: 23
The issue confronting us is, therefore, not whether a previously granted
exemption should continue, but whether an exemption should be granted
in the first instance. And that issue is for Congress to resolve, not this Court.
The Court noted that it had never held that the boxing business was not
subject to the antitrust laws, and that Congress had specifically refused to
grant organized sports a sweeping immunity from the antitrust laws.
Shortly after the Gardella decision a professional football player, Wil-
liam Radovich, filed a complaint under the antitrust laws. The complaint
charged that the National Football League had conspired to monopolize
22348 U.S. 236 (1995). The district court, on remand, found that the defendants had
conspired to monopolize the business of promoting professional championship boxing contests.
150 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The court issued a stringent decree, TRADE REG. REP. (1957
Trade Cas.) 1 68759 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction on
appeal. 356 U.S. 910 (1958).
23 348 U.S. at 243.
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the business of football and attempted to destroy the rival All-America
Conference. It complained that the defendants enforced sanctions against
players who violated the "reserve clause" contracts. The complaint also
charged that the defendants used a uniform player's contract which re-
served the football player to one club and which prevented him from ever
playing for any team other than his original employer unless the employer
consented to the change. The defendants moved for dismissal after answer
in the district court, and the motion for dismissal was granted. The dis-
missal occurred before the decision in the International Boxing Club case.
The appellate court affirmed the district court and held that the Toolson
case still applied to group team sports. 4 It held as an additional ground
that the complaint had failed to allege an adverse effect on the public
interest.
The Supreme Court in the Radovich case followed its reasoning in the
International Boxing Club case. It held that professional football, like
boxing, had never been the subject of a prior Supreme Court ruling, and
that the Court could not grant industries a sweeping exemption from anti-
trust application. It then held that the complaint had sufficiently alleged
that the defendants were engaged in interstate commerce and had violated
the antitrust laws. The Court also said that the antitrust laws protected
victims of forbidden practices as well as the public and that a professional
athlete had a cause of action against those alleged to have violated the
antitrust laws to his injury. The Court further held that all businesses en-
gaged in interstate commerce were under the scope of the antitrust laws,
except the business of baseball. In this respect, the Radovich decision rep-
resents the end of constant applications for judicial exemptions from anti-
trust liability by interstate industry groups under Federal Baseball and
Toolson.
The Effect of the Radovich Decision
It would appear that the effect of the Radovich decision was to place
the contracts, agreements and practices of organized professional sport
leagues, with the exception of baseball, under the full vigor of the federal
antitrust laws. Since these laws provide for free and open competitive con-
ditions at all stages of the distributive system, these contracts, agreements
and practices would have to be reconciled with such provisions. An unre-
stricted antitrust approach to these practices would at least include the
following: free and equal opportunity for the development of franchises
in communities which do not have professional sport teams; equality of
bargaining between the individual professional athlete and the franchise
2 4 Radovich v. National Football League. 231 F.2d 620 (9th Cir., 1956).
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or team owners; complete contractual freedom with respect to radio and
television broadcasting of the league's presentations; subjection of the use
of power by the commissioner to remedial processes.
An antitrust examination of the practices of the sporting leagues would
clearly take into consideration the following conditions.
Monopoly Power
The organized professional sporting leagues hold monopoly power in
their fields. There can be little doubt that each of the sports of baseball,
football, basketball and hockey are free of any competition from other
leagues or individuals. They are monopolies, so the few men who hold fran-
chises in these leagues are operating free of any competitive struggle, and
control the industry.
Apart from the question of how this monopoly control was acquired,
it would appear that the constitutions and bylaws of these leagues as now
in effect can prevent effective competition from developing. Applications
for new franchises and the entry of new teams into these leagues are sub-
ject to the vote of the existing franchise owners. Existing owners thus have
veto power over the desire of community sponsors to field professional
teams.a The only alternative methods for a city to obtain professional
teams, apart from such veto power, is by the formation of an entire new
league, a venture requiring enormous capital and cooperation from en-
trenched competitors.
Treatment of Players
The professional sport leagues place the player in the position of being
a semi-chattel. The player must sign a uniformly adopted contract, 2 and
2 5 Baseball's major league rule I(c) requires that unanimous approval of both leagues must
be obtained before the circuit of either major league can be changed to include any city in the
circuit of the other major league. Changes to cities not in the major leagues need only be voted or
approved by the major league to which the club is a member. Express provision, however, is
allowed for the inclusion of a third league composed of eight clubs into major league baseball
upon the satisfaction of enumerated conditions. 1957 Hearings 1587. The National League and
the American League, however, can consist of not more than ten members. National League,
constitution and rules, art. 3.1, id. at 1421; American League, constitution and bylaws, art. V,
§ 3, id. at 1394. N.F.L. requires unanimous approval for new membership. Constitution and
bylaws, art. V, § 3, id. at 2580o-80p. N.H.L. requires a three-fourths vote to approve new
membership. Constitution, art. Il, § 3, id. at 3012. N.BA. requires a two-thirds vote to approve
new membership. Constitution and by laws, cls. 11 and 13, id. at 2938-39.
26The uniform or standard player's contracts appear as follows: Major league baseball,
1957 Hearings 1491; minor league, id. at 392; N.F.L., id. at 2748; N.B.A., id. at 2958; N.HL,
id. at 3007.
Baseball's major league rules 3 (a) requires the use of a uniform player's contract containing
a reserve clause. 1957 Hearings 1589. The player is not eligible to play for any other club than
his original club, and lists are circulated to insure this. Major league rule 4, id. at 1598. How-
ever a club has no right to reserve a player to whom it is indebted for arrears in salary as to
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this contract can then be bought and sold by the team owners. The player
can be traded, and the player must play for the assignee of his contract. 27
Further, the athlete may be prevented from entering into competitive nego-
tiations with various club owners and may be subjected to practices which
limit his bargaining potentials. s
which no bona fide undecided dispute exists. Upon application to the commissioner the player
in such a situation may become a free agent. Further, a player reserved for two consecutive
years on a retired, restricted, disqualified or ineligible list is omitted from future reserve lists.
But he shall not be eligible until first reinstated according to rule 16, and upon such reinstate-
ment he is restored to his reserving club. Rule 16 governs the reinstatement of players and
provides for such reinstatement by application to the commissioner through the president of
the club. Id at 1620-21. A player on an ineligible list cannot play until the lapse of one year.
Upon the refusal of a player to sign with his reserving club he is ineligible to play for any
team until reinstated. Ibid. With respect to these rules Ford Frick, commissioner of baseball,
stated: "At that time [1952], the major-league rule 15 provided that any player who jumped
his contract or reservation should not be eligible to make application for reinstatement for
five years. Rule 15 (b) provided that a player who, without permission, failed to report to
the club within 10 days after the opening of the season would be ineligible. Since those
hearings, the rules have been revised. The penalty of 5 years of mandatory ineligibility for
a major-league player who jumps his contract or reservation was eliminated in December
1951. At the same time, provision was made that the player who failed to report within 10
days should be placed on a restricted list (from which reinstatement would be automative upon
application) rather than upon the ineligible list. By amendments adopted in 1952, only those
players found guilty of misconduct, such as throwing games, under major-minor league rule 21,
or moral turpitude, are placed on the ineligible list. Players who jump their contracts are
placed on the disqualified list, and there is no longer any restriction on the time within which
reinstatement may be applied for. There is now no rule barring prompt reinstatement of a
player who jumps to an outside league. The policy of the commissioner and the president of
the national association is to permit ready reinstatement of restricted-list and disqualified-list
players." 1957 Hearings 168.
N.F.L. requires the adoption of a uniform player's contract, and the ineligibility of
players who refuse to sign a contract. (The reserve clause in football is limited to a one year
period) Constitution and by-laws, art. XII, § 4; art. XIII. 1957 Hearings 2580ac-80ad. N.H.L.
provides that a player may be suspended by his club if he refuses the offer of salary. Thereafter
the president fixes the salary. And a reserved player who does not sign a contract with a club
may be suspended by the president with resort to appeal to the board of governors. Bylaws,
§§ 17.5-17.11, id. at 3067-68. The club owner in the N.B.A. has the right to suspend any
player for noncompliance with his contract provisions. Constitution and bylaws, § 41, id. at
2953. Such a suspension may result in a blacklist. Ibid.
27 Uniform or standard player contract provisions: Major league baseball, para. 6(a),
1957 Hearings 1492; N.F.L. para. 9, id. at 2750; N.B.A. para. 10, id. at 2960; NIH.L. para. 11,
id. at 3008.
28 In all the sport leagues except baseball provision is made that player-owner disputes
shall be decided by the commissioner or president, whose decision is final. N.F.L. constitution
and bylaws, article I, § 14 provides that the commissioner's decision shall be "final, binding,
conclusive and without appeal." And it further provides that he and the N.F.L. and all owners
and clubs are released from liability. 1957 Hearings 2580f-80g. The uniform player's contract
provides in paragraph 4 that "all matters in dispute between the player and the club shall
be referred to the Commissioner." Id. at 2749. For the N.H.L. provisions see note 26 supra.
The N.B.A. uniform player's contract, paragraph 20, provides that in case of dispute between
the player and the club, as to matters covered by the contract, the matter must be submitted
to the president whose decision is final. As to matters not covered by the contract the player
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The reserve clause. Before a player may play for a team he must sign
a uniform player's contract with a given club owner. Thus, the club owner
has no discretion in the type of contract he uses in employing the player.
The uniform player's contract requires the player to play for the team
owner, and allows the owner the option to renew the contract. This is the
so-called "reserve clause." All the sport leagues except football allow the
option to be exercised year after year.' Football limits it to one year.30
However, the record contains few examples of professional football play-
ers ever having successfully waited out the one year to become free
agents.3 Upon signing of the contract, the player becomes a property right
and can be sold, traded or waived out of the club by the owner to other
owners. Once the player signs the uniform player's contract he cannot
usually become a free bargaining agent unless he is waived out of the club
and no other club owner calls the waiver.32
The rights of the owner to the contract provisions in the contract are
not enforced by resort to the courts, but by extra-judicial sanctions of in-
eligibility, suspension, or blacklisting. Thus a player can only play in the
league if he has signed a contract with a club owner. Once he does so, he is
on the reserve list of the club owner. No other club owner can then bargain
with him.33 He is limited to play with his own club owner. If he disputes his
salary, he must either bargain it out with the club owner, or not be employed
in the league at all 4 The dispute in all sports except baseball is resolved
has the right to appeal from the president's determination to a committee of the board
of governors, the members of which are chosen by the player, and the determination of this
committee is binding on all parties. 1957 Hearings 2962. Baseball's major league rule 22 provides
that all clubs and players must submit all disputes, except player compensation disputes, to
the commissioner, whose decisions shall be accepted as final. Major league baseball allows two
player representatives to attend meetings of the executive council and they exercise votes as to
matters concerning the standard form of player's contract, its provisions or regulations, or
the player's pension plan. Statement of Commissioner Ford Frick, 1957 Hearings 169. Major
league rule 26, id. at 1627-28.
29Uniform or standard player contract provisions: Major league baseball, paras. 10(a),
10(b), 1957 Hearings 1493; N.BA. para. 22, id. at 2962; N.H.L. para. 17, id. at 3008.
SO N.F.L. standard player's contract, para. 10, 1957 Hearings 2750.
31 Statement by Creighton Miller, attorney for the National Football League Players
Association, 1957 Hearings 2665, 2668.
82 Waiver provisions appear as follows: Major league baseball rules 8 and 10, 1957
Hearings 1604-05, 1608-10; N.F.L., constitution and by laws, art. XV, id. at 2580af-80ah;
N.B.A., by laws §§ 27-35, id. at 2952; N.HL., by-laws § 11, id. at 3050-52. In major league
baseball an unconditional release waiver allows the player to terminate his contract on option.
Major league rule 8(a) (4), id. at 1604.
33 It is unlawful conduct and subjects the owner to fine for him to tamper with players.
These rules appear, in part, as follows: Major league baseball rule 3(g), 1957 Hearings 1591;
N.F.L., constitution and by laws, art. VIII, § 4, art. XII, art. XIV, § 3, id. at 2580v, 2580ad-
80af; NH.HL., by laws, §§ 9, 15, id. at 3047, 3060; N.BA., constitution, § 85, id. at 2948, by laws,
99 16-21, id. at 2950-51. See also note 26 supra.
34 See notes 26 and 28 supra.
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by the commissioner or president 5 who may declare the player ineligible.
The ineligibility of a player is not limited to the option or reserve
clauses, but may be related to issues entirely apart from the uniform play-
er's contract. Thus, the player may be blacklisted for having played in
competitive leagues, for refusing to be traded, or for otherwise refusing to
abide by the edicts of the club owner or the commissioner."
Furthermore, the play may be subjected to a variety of restraints
found in the uniform player's contract or in the constitutions and bylaws
of the leagues which seriously impair his earnings. These restraints are
discussed herein by reference to the chronology of the player's entry into
a league. They are the "player draft," the extent of the ineligibility list or
boycott, and the use of provisions of the uniform player's contract which
affect the player's earning abilities.
The player draft. The National Football League and the National
Basketball Association operate by means of a player draft. This draft
allows the club owners to pick college players upon entry into the league
by a selection system based on the inverse order of the club's final standing
in the league in the previous season. A meeting is held and the team owner
picks the player with whom he will contract. The player must either sign
with the draftor or not play at all.37
85 See note 28 supra.
86 Baseball's Major League-National Association rule 15(c) (2) places a player on the
disqualified list for playing for a club containing ineligible players. 1957 Hearings 1675-76.
N.F.L., constitution and by laws, article VIII, § 7 bans a player for a season if said player
is under contract with a club owner, does not report for the first regular games, and has
played in any other league (an exception may be American minor leagues or teams). Id. at
2580w. Boycotts may be enforced against American players who seek reentry from Canada
on the decision of the commissioner, since all players who have played in Canada must have
a hearing before the commissioner. Ibid. N.B.A., uniform player's contract paragraph 4(a)
provides that the player will not engage in strike activity or "interfere in any manner what-
soever with the operation or conduct of the business of said Association or of any member
thereof." For violation of this provision the president is empowered to suspend the player
for an indefinite period. 1957 Hearings 2958. N.H.L. by-laws, § 17.5 provides that a player
under contract with a member club who, without the written permission of such club, plays
with a club of any other league or organization, may be suspended or expelled at the discretion
and ruling of the President. Id. at 3067.
87 The draft provisions appear as follows: N.F.L., 1957 Hearings 2580s-80t; N.H.L., id.
at 3061-65; N.B.A., id. at 2954-55; major league baseball, id. at 1656-59. Leslie M. O'Connor,
President of the Pacific Coast League, in his letter to Hon. Emanuel Celler, dated July 25, 1957,
states as to the player draft: "The common, statutory and constitutional law of the States
and the United States, and probably the law of other countries, is completely hostile to notions
that any person's natural right to contract for his own labor, and to earn his livelihood thereby,
can be thus confined and restricted. Any enterprise, whether in sport or otherwise, which
asserts its ability to live rests upon such a 'right' as it thus confiscates, is founded upon quick-
sand. That such a 'right' is not essential is demonstrated by baseball's successful operation of
many years. It is merely a measure to curtail costs of player recruitment. And football is most
fortunately situated in that it gets most, if not all, of its players from the colleges. They are
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Ineligibility, blacklist, boycott and ban. The leagues may be considered
separately on the subject of player ineligibility and enforcement of con-
tract provisions by group refusal to deal. Baseball and hockey are in one
category because they have working agreements with virtually all poten-
tial competitors. The National Football League is in another category
because it has potential competition from the Canadian football leagues.
As seen abovea37 contacts by American football players with the Canadian
leagues will result in a hearing before the commissioner before eligibility
can be established in the National Football League.
The major leagues of baseball have entered into an agreement with the
National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, or the minor
leagues, which covers virtually all of baseball.38 This agreement extends
the enforcement of the ineligibility lists of major and minor league baseball
throughout the baseball world. Thus, baseball can subject the player to an
industry-wide blacklist and boycott operating both in the major and minor
leagues. Likewise, the National Hockey League has had a working agree-
ment with other professional and amateur organizations covering virtually
the entire hockey world.3
Uniform player contract conditions. (i) Non-payment for exhibition
season. The sport leagues do not provide that a player's salary commences
at the time the contract is signed, covering exhibition season play, but
rather the contract payments begin at the start of the so-called regular or
championship play-off season.4" But the exhibition season may call for the
developed there and, additionally, they often bring with them, very profitably to the pro-
fessional sport, outstanding reputations for skill. Baseball's player-recruitment and development
costs are immensely greater; and in large measure the players benefit therefrom, which is why
players generally favor baseball's reserve-clause system. Even were the football 'right' essential,
it would remain inconceivable that the House judiciary Committee would recommend or
the Congress would adopt, legislation specifically approving it, or that the courts would fail
to denounce such legislation as an intolerable violation of the basic human and constitutional
rights of the 'individual unorganized worker' (quoting from the 'public policy of the United
States' expressed in the Norris-La Guardia Act) 'helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions
of employment.' Are not outstanding athletes entitled to the rights of other citizens? 'The
right to pursue ... (ordinary employments) without let or hindrance ... is a distinguishing
privilege of citizens of the United States and an essential element of that freedom which they
claim as their birthright (Butchers Union v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757; also see
Dant v. Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121; Meyer v. Nebraska, 252 U.S. 390, 399; Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 26,28,30; and many other cases which could be cited) ." 1957 Hearings 2909, 2911.
37a See note 36 supra.
38 Major League-National Association Rules, 1957 Hearings 1644-84. The rules providing
for recognition of ineligible, suspended, and disqualified lists are rules 13-16, id. at 1674-76.
39 Statement of C. S. Campbell, President, N.H.L., 1957 Hearings, 2979-86, 2984-85. Thus
the refusal of the hockey player to abide by the salary decision of the President of the N.H.L.
could result in an industry wide ineligibility. By laws, §§ 12, 17.6, 17.7, 1957 Hearings 3053, 3067.
4 0 N.F.L., standard player's contract, paras. 1, 3, 1957 Hearings 2748-49. N.B.A., uniform
player's contract, paragraphs 1 and 2, specifically provides that employment begins October 1,
but that salary is not paid until November 15. Id. at 2958. Major league baseball's uniform
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same type of operation and play as the regular season. Football, for ex-
ample, has an extensive exhibition season. These exhibition games are
usually televised and are well attended by paying fans. But the football
player has no uniform contract right to payment for participating in the
exhibition games.4
(ii) Non-payment of full contract price upon termination of the con-
tract. There is a variety of treatment between leagues as to whether or not
the player will receive full contract pay upon severance from the team.
The National Football League provides that a player may be severed from
the team upon the decision of the head coach that he is not in "excellent
physical condition," or if in the opinion of the head coach the "player's
work or conduct in the performance of this contract is unsatisfactory as
compared with the work and conduct of other members of the club's squad
of players . . ." Upon such termination the football player may receive
compensation only for prior service.42 Thus, a football player may have
no contract right to a full year's pay upon injury. Basketball, hockey, and
baseball, however, provide that the player will receive his contract right
to a full season's salary if he is injured as a result of playing with the club.4"
Television and Radio
Whether or not the public may see televised sport presentations depends
upon either group-imposed rules and regulations or upon understandings
that recognize the ability of the club owner to control all telecasting as to
presentations in his home city.
Again the leagues may be treated separately. This is so because of the
decision in United States v. National Football League.44 In this case the
constitution and bylaw provisions of the National Football League cover-
ing the subject of television and broadcasting were the subject of extensive
examination by the federal court. The court held that such constitution
and bylaws were contracts in restraint of trade, and applied the antitrust
player's contract, paragraph 2, provides that the contract salary shall commence at the start
of the "playing season," and paragraph 1 distinguishes the training season, the exhibition games
season, the playing season, and the World Series. Id. at 1491. N.H.L., standard player's contract,
paragraph 1, provides that payment shall start at the commencement of the regular league
championship schedule of games or following the date reporting, whichever is later. Id. at 3007.
41 See note 40 supra. But the constitution and by laws of the NY.L., article XX, § 2,
item 3, specifically provides that the clubs must play at least five pre-season, non-conference
games. 1957 Hearings 2580aq.
42 N.F.L., standard player's contract, paras. 6 and 7. 1957 Hearings 2749.
43 N.H.L., standard player's contract, paragraph 5 allows suspension by the club for
physical unfitness without full contract pay, but excepts "unless such condition is the direct
result of playing hockey for the club." 1957 Hearings 3008. The N.B.A. contract, paragraph 6,
is similar. Id. at 2959. So is baseball's major league uniform player's contract, paragraph 7(c).
Id. at 1492.
44 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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standard of the "rule of reason" to them. It then concluded that the fol-
lowing were in unreasonable restraint of trade: (a) Agreements to prevent
the broadcasting of contests either when the team was playing at home or
away from home; (b) Agreements to prevent the sale of rights for the tele-
casting of outside games in a club's home territory on the day when the
home club is permitting the telecast of its road games in its home territory.
Thus, the court enjoined the league from restricting the sale of television
rights by other team owners when the home team is playing away and its
gate receipts are not affected by the telecast of other games.
The televising of major league baseball contests seems to be subject to
the decisions of the home city owners. Thus, the nationally televised "game
of the week" did not appear in San Francisco upon the advent of the San
Francisco Giants. The Giants, according to newspaper reports, had signed
a "pay" television agreement, and did not televise their games at all. The
situation with respect to the National Football League's championship
playoff game and world championship game raises an additional problem.
Neither San Francisco nor Detroit was able to watch televising of their
teams' final 1957 games even though the games were complete sell-outs and
were not included in the season's subscription price. Despite public demand
and requests by government officials the blackout of the games was main-
tained.
Powers of the Commissioner or President
The sport leagues allow the commissioner or president large powers in
their relations with players and in the ability to impose fines and sanctions
designed to protect the integrity of the game. The decisions of the commis-
sioner with respect to the player, except in baseball, appear to be final
and unappealable in all areas. He is not a player's representative, but is
appointed by the club owners. In the important field of owner control,
however, his powers are more limited. For example, an owner may not be
expelled from a league without the vote of the other owners.4 5
Applicability of Antitrust Laws
Clearly the sporting leagues considered as extra-governmental trusts
or considered in the light of their constitutional and bylaw restrictions on
4 5 Major league baseball's National League requires a unanimous vote of all members,
except the charged club, for termination. Constitution and rules, art. 3.9(f), 1957 Hearings 1425.
The American League provides that six members must approve the expulsion. Constitution § 7,
id. at 1396. N.F.L. requires an % vote. Constitution and bylaws, § 16, id. at 2580h.
N.H.L. requires a / vote of all members of the league, including the member charged, for
suspension of a member. Constitution, arts. 3.9, 3.10, id. at 3014-15. N.BA. requires a % vote,
also including the member charged. Constitution and by laws, cL. 22, id. at 2940-41.
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the free market are in violation of federal antitrust standards." The
statements of the Supreme Court in Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC47
would seem to apply to the sporting leagues. The Court stated:48
Under the Sherman Act, competition not combination should be the law of
trade. And among the many respects in which the Guild's plan runs con-
trary to the policy of the Sherman Act are these: it narrows the outlets to
which garment and textile manufacturers can sell and the sources from
which retailers can buy; subjects all retailers and manufacturers who de-
cline to comply with the Guild's program to an organized boycott; takes
away the freedom of action of members by requiring each to reveal to the
Guild the intimate details of their individual affairs; and has both as its
necessary tendency and as its purpose and effect the direct suppression of
competition from the sale of unregistered textiles and copied designs. In
addition to all this, the combination is in reality an extra-governmental
agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate
commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and
punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches upon the power of the national
legislature and violates the statute.' [Citations omitted.] 49
The antitrust laws as presently applicable probably affect the following
practices in the sporting leagues so as to subject them to judicial examina-
tion or administrative action. The veto power of existing club owners to
prevent new franchises would be subject to the establishment of conditions
which would allow free and equal access into the leagues by all cities, pro-
vided they could meet reasonable population and capital requirements. The
player would have access to the federal courts for redress of league prac-
tices imposed on him which limit his compensation, freedom to play, and
bargaining position. Conduct of the leagues with respect to radio and tele-
vision agreements would be treated as any other restraint of trade. Pre-
rogative power of the commissioner or president would be subject to
stipulated administrative standards and judicial review.
Developments After the Radovich Decision
Another effect of the Radovich decision was to cause the control of the
organized professional sport leagues to be placed directly in the hands of
the federal government under the commerce clause. The Supreme Court
46 Cf. Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926), where the
Supreme Court held that employers could not agree to fix the terms and conditions of employ-
ment and deny employees freedom of selection.
47 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
48 Id. at 465-66.
49 See United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389 (1923); Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609-11 (1914) ; Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co., 226 U.S. 20, 48, 49 (1912); National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115,
129 (1905) ; W. W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 45 (1904) ; Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899).
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held that Congress had regulated organized professional team sports in its
general regulation of all interstate businesses under the antitrust laws, with
the one exception of baseball. As to baseball, the Court stated that Con-
gress had the power to provide for its coverage under these laws. Thus, the
Congress was faced with the problem of how to exercise its constitutional
powers in the regulation of the interstate sporting leagues. Should the anti-
trust laws apply or should other standards or rules be adopted?
Immediately following the Radovich case, various bills were introduced
regarding application of the antitrust laws to organized professional team
sports.5" One provided that the sports be brought squarely within the ambit
of the laws. Others granted limited or complete exemption. The House then
conducted hearings5' which lasted from June 17 to August 8, 1957. Ap-
pearing as witnesses were the commissioners of the four sport leagues along
with players and player association attorneys. The commissioners con-
tended that sporting leagues were different from all other industries in that
the owners are not competitive to one another. On the contrary, they
argued, they must cooperate in order to insure operation of the leagues.
Further, they urged that their present practices had been in operation for
many years and that they had been found to be indispensable for the proper
functioning of the business. If these practices should violate the antitrust
laws and be held unlawful, it was said the leagues would be faced with
insurmountable difficulties of operation. They were fearful that without
their present practices they would be unable to function, in that the wealthy
teams would obtain the best available talent, which would prevent competi-
tive playing strength. This argument is the basic justification for the player
draft. The commissioners also feared the possibility of multitudinous liti-
gation. They submitted statements outlining their positions.52
Committee Report
On May 13, 1958, the House Subcommittee issued its Report on the
Applicability of Antitrust Laws to Professional Team Sports.5" The report
contained three views. The majority view was that the sport leagues should
be subjected to the antitrust laws, but that they should have the benefit of
having the courts consider their practices as reasonable. The sport leagues
5 H.R. REP. No. 5307, 5319, 5383, 6876, 6877, 8023, 8124, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
511957 Hearings.
52 Ford C. Frick, Commissioner of Baseball, 1957 Hearings 164-72; George M. Trautman,
President, National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, id. at 211-17; Bert Bell,
Commissioner, N.F.L., id. at 2722-35; Maurice Podoloff, President, N.BA., id. at 2904-08;
C. S. Campbell, President, NMH.L, id. at 2979-86.
53 H.R. REP. No. 1720, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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would have the ability to prove that the practices attacked, if within the
enumeration of the bill, were reasonably necessary for the "equalization
of competitive playing strength," the right to operate within geographical
territories, and the "preservation of public confidence in the honesty of the
sport contests." The majority view thus precluded the application of the
per se rule' of illegality to the sport leagues. The majority stated:"
The ordinary commercial enterprise is expected to make every legitimate
effort to sell as much of its products or services as possible. The fact that
in the course of aggressively seeking business in this manner many of its
competitors may be unable to remain in business, is not of particular con-
cern to it. Participants in professional team sports that are organized in
leagues, however, are unable to compete fully in their ordinary commercial
practices. While it is essential that on the playing field there must be con-
tinuous and vigorous competition between the opposing clubs in order that
spectator interest may be stimulated and continued, the various clubs with-
in the sport cannot compete fully, for example, to secure the player talent
that is essential for their business needs. The history of baseball demon-
strates that unless arrangements are made to prevent competition among
the clubs for players, the larger and richer teams outbid their rivals for the
best players and become so powerful and one-sided that spectator interest
in the contests threatens to be lost, with the entire industry accordingly
placed in jeopardy.
With respect to the practices of the leagues in their relations with players,
the majority stated:"
The committee is of the view that a reasonable reserve clause recognition
system, supplemented by farm systems, player draft and waiver rules, or a
reasonable player selection system, are needed for the continuation of the
sports in which such procedures have been developed and are utilized. The
committee believes, however, that these procedures, embodying as they do
provisions for group boycotts, reasonably may be applied only to partici-
pants within a particular sport. Group boycotts which are applied against
persons who have left the organized professional team sports would be un-
reasonable. An example is contained in the provisions of section 30.09 of
the National Association Agreement in the prohibition against permitting
former employees to use parks or stadia even for exhibition purposes after
they have become separated from the organized sport.
A minority took the position that the organized sport leagues should be
entirely free of liability in the federal courts under the antitrust laws in
5 4 In antitrust litigation, under the per se rule of illegality, certain agreements or practices,
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are con-
clusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. Among the agreements
in per se restraint of trade are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts and tying
arrangements. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
55 H.R. E I. No. 1720, supra. note 53, at 6.
5 6 Id. at 8.
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certain enumerated fields without the application of either the rule of reason
or the per se rule.57 An additional view held that sport contests are not
trade or business and should not be covered by the antitrust laws.
House Action
The view favoring exemption from the antitrust laws prevailed in the
House. The doctrine of "reasonably necessary" was defeated on June 24,
1958, by voice vote. Instead, the House passed the Walter Bill which would
completely exempt professional sport leagues in the spheres enumerated
in the bill. (See appendix.) There then followed hearings before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. On Aug-
ust 1, 1958, the Senate subcommittee voted to table the House bill. Subse-
quently Congress adjourned, and at this writing the Radovich decision is
still in force.
Issues Confronting the Senate
Delegation of Authority to Private Parties
The Walter Bill may come before the Senate for action in the next
Congress. A basic problem confronting it is this. The Walter Bin would
exempt from operation of the federal antitrust laws activities that are con-
cededly interstate commerce. As such, they are subject to the regulation of
Congress and a federally imposed standard of conduct. Of course Congress
has the power to exempt the sport leagues from this regulation. It has
done so with other trades and industries. But Congress has not granted
extensive exemptions from commerce and antitrust regulation to industry
groups without delegating federal authority over the industry involved to
state government or a responsible federal agency.58 Furthermore, in dele-
gating authority it has been held that Congress must set up a primary
standard of conduct.59
The Walter Bill would provide for non-responsibility to the federal
antitrust laws and the basic standard of conduct established by them. The
sport leagues would be subject to no standard but that of the leagues them-
selves. Would this not be in essence a delegation of federal power to pri-
57 Id. at 10-11.
58 The Insurance Antitrust Moratorium Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-15 (1952), exempting the interstate insurance business from the antitrust laws, spe-
cifically delegated authority to the several states for "continued regulation." The Webb-Export
Trade Associations Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1952), exempting
export association agreements from the antitrust laws, specifically provided that the Federal
Trade Commission should have information and investigative powers to insure that trade
and commerce among the several states was not subject to such agreements.
59 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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vate parties, monopolists, and hence unconstitutional? An attempt to dele-
gate authority to set minimum wages to a majority of the producers in
an industry has been held unconstitutional." Since the leagues are con-
trolled by the club owners it would seem there is a similar situation here.
It may be concluded that the Walter Bill is open to objection on this ground.
There is no delegation of authority to a responsible agency.
Player Employment Issue
As to league practices in the areas of player employment control and
equalization of player strength, the bill denies the players the benefits of
the Radovich decision. On the other hand, a commendable provision is
the allowance of collective bargaining between players and owners. But
with league power over the players left intact it is difficult to see how
players could be in any substantially better position through the use of
this machinery.
As noted, there are four practices, engaged in to varying degrees in
some or all of the sports, which directly affect the player. These are the
reserve clause contract; rules of ineligibility, blacklist and ban; non-
payment for exhibition games and non-payment of full contract salary
upon termination; and the player draft system. The Walter Bill may be
held to exempt these practices from attack under the antitrust laws. But
is it not difficult to defend these practices as being urgent necessities rather
than merely convenient methods of operation?
Reserve clause. Under the present reserve clause contracts the club
owner is not only getting the benefit of an exclusive-services contract, but
he is also depriving the player of his bargaining powers at the end of the
year, even though the owner only has an optional hold on the player. If
the owners, however, were to enter into exclusive-service contracts for
longer periods of time, say two to five years, with no reserve clause, they
would still be deriving benefits for the period of the contract but would
not be depriving the player of his bargaining powers at the end of the
period. In the absence of such a contract it would appear unfair to prevent
the player from seeking competitive bidding for his services. If such a
contract were valid it would seem that special antitrust treatment would
be unnecessary, for the owner would have resort to the courts, perhaps
for specific performance of the contract, or at least for contract damages,
if the contract were breached.
Ineligibility, blacklist, and ban. The same comments may be made
here. Valid contracts are enforced by the courts and not by private parties
60 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398, 399 (1940), the Court clearly indicated delegation of powers to an
industry without the supervision of a responsible agency would be invalid. See also note 48
supra.
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using extra-judicial sanctions. When such sanctions impose conditions
which make it impossible for an athlete to obtain his livelihood in his
profession, private parties are allowed to assume the dictates of the sov-
ereign. The probability of contract litigation would seem to be a sufficient
sanction against the player's breaching a valid player contract and against
other owners from inducing a breach of such contract. The enforcement
of sanctions into other leagues is clearly unrelated to equalization of
competitive playing strength, and would seem especially subject to an
allowance of remedial action in the federal courts.
Uniform Contract Conditions. Provisions in a group-imposed uniform
player's contract with respect to non-payment for exhibition games and
for non-payment of full contract salary upon termination at the option
of the owner have absolutely no relation to the equalization of competitive
playing strength, so again an antitrust exemption does not seem justified.
Player Draft. There is no question that the player draft, as a method
of selecting players, is convenient to the leagues, but can it be defended
as reasonably necessary? The draft requires the players to shoulder, in
full, the problem of equal playing strength. Essentially, though, this is
the owners' problem and should be met by them. Also, several points
may be made as to the actual value of the player draft as a tool in main-
taining equality of playing strength among the teams. In professional
football, for example, franchise owners frequently trade future draft picks
for active players, which is clearly contradictory to the supposed purpose
of the draft. Also, it is certainly arguable that the scouting system, and
not money, is the real key to the selection of players. That is, no team
owner really knows that he is getting a valuable player simply on the
basis of that player's "price tag." Many of today's professional stars were
unknowns in college or amateur ranks, and the poorer teams have as much
opportunity to discover these players as the wealthier clubs.
Historically a few teams have, in fact, dominated the professional
football leagues despite the draft, which is designed to equalize playing
strength. It seems that the success of teams is more dependent on coaching
and scouting ability than on key draft choices. Also, the colleges are pro-
ducing more good athletes in football and basketball than can be absorbed
in the professional leagues, so it would seem that the draft is unnecessary.
In addition the football player draft covers approximately 360 football
players, which is virtually the entire supply of talent, so it is not limited
to just the top few players as would be supposed if its sole purpose was
to equalize playing strength.
Conclusion
The practices of the organized professional sport leagues certainly
raise antitrust issues. The question now is whether these leagues will be
required to conform to the standards of the antitrust laws or whether
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other standards of conduct will be applied to the leagues. The immediate
answer to this question will have to come from the United States Senate.
It is felt that the sporting leagues themselves can come forth with affirma-
tive proposals effecting substantial changes in their internal operation.
Such changes ought to be accomplished before the leagues are allowed
antitrust exemption in any of their activities.
APPENDIX
H.R. REP. No. 10378, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
AN ACT
To limit the applicability of the antitrust laws so as to exempt certain aspects of
designated professional team sports, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended (26 Stat.
209; The Act of October 15, 1914, as amended (38 Stat. 730); and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended (38 Stat. 717), shall not apply to any contract, agree-
ment, rule, course of conduct, or other activity by, between, or among persons con-
ducting, engaging in, or participating in the organized professional team sports of
baseball, football, basketball, and hockey which relate to-
(1) the equalization of competitive playing strengths;
(2) the employment, selection, or eligibility of players,
or the reservation, selection, or assignment of player
contracts;
(3) the right to operate within specified geographic areas;
(4) the regulation of rights to broadcast and telecast re-
ports and pictures of sports contests; or
(5) the preservation of public confidence in the honesty
in sports contests.
Sec. 2. As used in this Act, "persons" means any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion or unincorporated association, or any combination or association thereof.
Sec. 3. Nothing in this Act shall affect any cause of action existing on the effective
date hereof in respect to the organized professional team sports of baseball, football,
basketball, or hockey.
Sec. 4. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to deprive any players in the organized
professional team sports of baseball, football, basketball, or hockey of any right to
bargain collectively, or to engage in other associated activities for their mutual aid or
protection.
Sec. 5. Except as provided in section 1 of this Act, nothing contained in this Act
shall affect the applicability of the antitrust laws to the organized professional team
sports of baseball, football, basketball, or hockey.
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